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KIOBEL  SURPRISE:  UNEXPECTED  BY  SCHOLARS
BUT  CONSISTENT  WITH  INTERNATIONAL
TRENDS
Eugene Kontorovich *
INTRODUCTION
A primary function of legal scholarship is to incubate ideas to inform the
bench and bar.  Yet several Supreme Court Justices have recently spoken out
publicly about what they consider the growing irrelevance of academic legal
scholarship1 (though empirical findings suggest the continued utility of law
reviews to judges).2  The legal academy sometimes entirely misses what turn
out to be major and decisive legal issues in prominent areas, not recognizing
them at an early stage and dismissing their importance later on.  For exam-
ple, the great majority of professors dismissed the notion that the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) could violate the Com-
merce Clause.3
© 2014 Eugene Kontorovich.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame
Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor, Northwestern University School of Law.
1 See Jess Bravin, Chief Justice Roberts on Obama, Justice Stevens, Law Reviews, More, Wall
St. J.L. Blog (Apr. 7, 2010, 7:20 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/07/chief-justice-
roberts-on-obama-justice-stevens-law-reviews-more; Scalia’s Critique of Legal Education Echoes
UNH Law’s Practice-Ready Philosophy, UNIV. N.H. SCH. L. (Mar. 25, 2013), http://law.unh
.edu/news/2013/03/scalias-critique-of-legal-education-echoes-unh-laws-practice-ready-phil
osop; see also Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews Irrele-
vant, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/19/us/19bar.html
(discussing comments made by Judge Dennis G. Jacobs of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals regarding legal scholarship and its lack of influence on his rulings).
2 See Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the Supreme
Court’s Use of Legal Scholarship, 106 NW. U.L. REV. 995, 995 (2011); David L. Schwartz & Lee
Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345, 1352–70 (2011).
3 David Hyman has argued that constitutional scholars’ contemptuous treatment of
challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act represents a “high profile
failure[ ]” of the profession.  David A. Hyman, Why Did Law Professors Misunderestimate the
Lawsuits Against PPACA?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2224364.
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The ruling in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.4 similarly blind-sided the
academy.  The case involved one of the most important, contentious, and
dynamic aspects of U.S. foreign relations law—the ability of foreigners to sue
in U.S. courts for extraterritorial violations of customary international law
(CIL) under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).5  Yet the Court surprised observ-
ers by deciding the case on grounds almost entirely ignored by the acad-
emy—the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Despite an extensive academic literature on the statute,6 the Court’s
decision was not anticipated by commentators,7 or for that matter, litigants
and inferior judges, making it in some ways a bigger shock than the Obama-
care ruling.8  Indeed, the issue had not even been part of the litigation in
Kiobel until the Court raised it sua sponte during oral argument9 of an entirely
different ATS issue.10  Subsequently, the Court surprised observers by calling
for further briefing in the next term.11  This finally inspired a sudden aca-
demic interest in the extraterritoriality questions.  Even then, the Court’s
unanimous acceptance of some extraterritoriality limitation came as yet
4 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
5 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”).
6 Between 1981 and the end of 2012, there were over 456 law review articles with the
ATS or major ATS cases in their title alone, and many more that dealt substantially with it.
(These are the results of a Westlaw search in the JLR database for [ti(atca ats “alien tort”
filtartiga sosa) & da(bef 2012)]).
7 Cf. Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019,
1082 (2011) (noting tension between ATS cases and the Morrison holding).
8 Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (upholding
Obamacare’s constitutionality under Congress’s taxation power).
9 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 24–35, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-1491
rearg.pdf.
10 See John Bellinger, Stop Press: Supreme Court Orders Kiobel Reargued to Address Extraterri-
toriality, LAWFARE (Mar. 5, 2012, 7:03 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/03/stop-
press-supreme-court-orders-kiobel-reargued-to-address-extraterritoriality/#.UtQ0X_SryxU.
11 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (mem.) (“Parties
are directed to file supplemental briefs addressing the following question: ‘Whether and
under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to recog-
nize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a
sovereign other than the United States.’”).
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another surprise to most observers,12 who predicted a split along more ideo-
logical lines.13
This Article examines the intellectual history of extraterritoriality argu-
ments in ATS litigation, while placing Kiobel in a broader context of global
developments.  The story of the winning argument in Kiobel is interesting not
just for ATS purposes, but as a case study in the path dependence of legal
doctrine and of agenda setting by the Supreme Court and the Justice Depart-
ment.  Amazingly, the issue that won in Kiobel, foreclosing most ATS litiga-
tion, had never been examined in a law review until a 2003 student note.14
No court ruled on it for three decades.15  Even in Kiobel, the issue had not
been raised below or by the litigants.  Thus, the Supreme Court sua sponte
raised an issue in the absence of any division of the lower courts or substan-
tial academic controversy.
Yet Kiobel can be understood as not involving the extraterritoriality pre-
sumption, but rather its more obscure cousin—the presumption against
universality.  ATS “foreign-cubed” cases have no U.S. nexus, unlike the typical
case raising extraterritoriality concerns.  This Article describes the implicit
presumption against universality that, while not having a name, has guided
courts since the early Republic.  It also comprehensively canvasses all statutes
under which universal jurisdiction (UJ) has been exercised and finds that,
aside from the ATS, Congress always explicitly creates UJ.  Moreover, the uni-
versal cognizability of a crime in international law is neither necessary nor
sufficient for UJ status in U.S. law.  This contradicts a major argument for UJ
under the ATS—that its reference to international law demonstrates and
implies a maximal application of UJ.
12 See, e.g., Diane Marie Amman, Alien Tort Statute Lives to Die Another Day,
DIANEMARIEAMANN (Apr. 18, 2013), http://dianemarieamann.com/2013/04/18/alien-
tort-statute-lives-to-die-another-day (expressing “surprise” at unanimous vote); Meir Feder,
Commentary: Why the Court Unanimously Jettisoned Thirty Years of Lower Court Precedent (And
What That Can Tell Us About How to Read Kiobel), SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 19, 2013, 11:30 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/commentary-why-the-court-unanimously-jettisoned-
thirty-years-of-lower-court-precedent-and-what-that-can-tell-us-about-how-to-read-kiobel;
Eugene Kontorovich, A Supreme Rebuke to Global Forum-Shopping, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2013,
7:20 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873244937045784305928
07923134.
13 The sua sponte request for supplemental briefing in Kiobel can be seen as another
example of Chief Justice Roberts’s preference for consensus.  The original issue in the case
was whether corporations could be liable for violations of international law.  For many, this
had echoes of Citizens United, a controversial and divisive case that held that corporations
have free speech rights that entitle them to engage in political spending.  Citizens United
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  The issue-switch allowed Kiobel to be decided on grounds that
are, for ATS purposes, both broader but less divisive.
14 See Jason Jarvis, Comment, A New Paradigm for the Alien Tort Statute Under Extraterrito-
riality and the Universality Principle, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 671, 699 (2003).
15 See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 F.
App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 247 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-4\NDL406.txt unknown Seq: 4  9-MAY-14 10:51
1674 notre dame law review [vol. 89:4
While Kiobel was a surprise from a domestic law context, it fits perfectly
into broader patterns in international law.  Universal jurisdiction, which had
seemed an ascendant law doctrine in the 1990s, has in the past decade
encountered a significant backlash, leading ultimately to its destabilization
and retrenchment.  Universal jurisdiction today rarely results in the exercise
of jurisdiction, and it is increasingly not universal, but sharply contested by
African and Asian states. Kiobel is the next major step in a broad disengage-
ment from UJ by leading Western nations.
Part I traces the discussion and application, or lack thereof, of the extra-
territoriality presumption both in academic literature and in litigation and
considers possible reasons for its extremely belated appearance after more
than two decades of litigation.  While normative approval of ATS litigation,
no doubt, contributed to the neglect of the issue in the exciting early years of
ATS litigation, its longstanding omission must also be attributed to broader
intellectual factors.  Part II places ATS “foreign-cubed” suits in the interna-
tional context of trends in the exercise of universal jurisdiction.  On this
background, Kiobel is no surprise, but merely the latest step in a withdrawal
from UJ by nations that had most aggressively exercised it.  Finally, Part III
argues that one reason the extraterritoriality presumption might have come
to mind is that ATS suits involved universality, something more extreme than
“mere extraterritoriality.”  Thus Kiobel can be understood as involving a
rather obscure—and yet unnamed—statutory presumption, the “presump-
tion against universality.”  This understanding of the case has significant
implications for the disagreement on the Court about the application of the
statute to conduct by Americans abroad.
I. TRACKING THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY PRESUMPTION IN ATS CASES
Modern ATS litigation began with a foreign-cubed case, Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala.16  The Second Circuit’s recognition of a cause of action for interna-
tional law violations under the ATS lead, eventually, to an extensive debate in
which most of the leading American foreign relations scholars participated.17
The dispute focused on such fundamental issues as the relation between CIL
and U.S. law, the extent of federal common law, and the role of courts in
foreign relations.18  Thus, the ATS was the focus of some of the most sus-
tained debates in foreign relations law.  It is in this context that the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality fell through the cracks.
This Part chronicles the discussion of the presumption in academic liter-
ature, where it received a late and brief role in the ATS debates.  It then
examines the path of the presumption in ATS cases, both because such litiga-
16 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
17 See Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to
the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 157–62 (sketching the “full-fledged contro-
versy” surrounding the ATS).
18 See Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A
Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 357–60 (2011) (chronicling aca-
demic debates over the ATS).
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tion often prominently featured briefs by professors, and to see how the
scholarly debate intersects with the judicial discussion.  Before proceeding,
given that there is some implicit criticism of academic shortsightedness here,
the author freely notes that he has engaged in the ATS debates himself for
some time, and is guilty of the same omissions.
A. Extraterritoriality in Commentary
Early commentary simply observed, favorably, that courts had not
applied the presumption against extraterritoriality in ATS cases, but did not
examine the issue.19  The first academic argument for applying the presump-
tion in ATS cases came, perhaps not surprisingly, from Curt Bradley and Jack
Goldsmith.20  However, perhaps because they raised the issue in the midst of
their broad and profound attack on the status of international law as federal
common law,21 this particular criticism of the ATS did not get immediate
further attention.
The first in-depth discussion of the relevance of the presumption to ATS
litigation came in a 2003 student note that argued for its applicability.22
Already this hit on the major pieces of evidence on both sides of the issue—
the Bradford memorandum on one hand and the specific issues giving rise to
the ATS on the other hand.23  The genre of student-edited law reviews, to say
nothing of student scholarship, receives regular derision.  The Jarvis note
shows that sometimes student work—which is thought to stick ploddingly to
doctrine—can be an effective incubator for novel ideas ignored by a hollow
academic consensus.24  Nonetheless, up until Kiobel, the general sense in the
academy weighed heavily against the relevance of the extraterritoriality pre-
sumption to ATS cases.25
19 See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries into
the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 62 (1985) (“While jurisdiction over
extraterritorial torts under the Alien Tort Statute has been denied for various reasons, it
has never been denied on the ground that the statute itself does not confer jurisdiction
over extraterritorial tort actions.”).  Randall suggests that the only relevant limit on extra-
territoriality would be personal jurisdiction. See id. at 65.
20 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith III, The Current Illegitimacy of International
Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 361–63 (1997).
21 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Com-
mon Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L REV. 815, 816 (1997); see also Michael
D. Ramsey, Multinational Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: Some Structural
Concerns, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 361, 370–71 (2003) (arguing that the ATS’s
text shows no intention to applied abroad, and the motivating incidents behind the law all
took place in the United States).
22 See Jarvis, supra note 14, at 699–709 (noting the lack of prior academic discussion R
on the issue).
23 See id. at 701.
24 The rewards for being first appear meager, at least for student notes: the Jarvis com-
ment was not cited in any of the subsequent decisions about the presumption.
25 See K. Lee Boyd, Universal Jurisdiction and Structural Reasonableness, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J.
1, 34–35 (2004) (arguing the presumption does not apply because of UJ status of the
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To be sure, the lack of discussion of the presumption against extraterri-
torial application of statutes does not mean scholars ignored any potential
concerns arising from the foreign subject matter of most ATS suits.  The
extraterritoriality issue permeated or informed a variety of objections to the
ATS.  But these concerns were usually explored in grander terms than the
extraterritoriality presumption—they were framed in international or consti-
tutional law terms, rather than modest federal courts interpretive canons.
Thus some scholars expressed a general concern that such lawsuits raised
separation of powers concerns by intruding into foreign relations matters.26
Several commentators invoked variants of the Charming Betsy canon,27 ques-
tioning whether the foreign-cubed suits truly enjoyed support in interna-
tional law,28 either because UJ itself is not well established, or civil UJ is not,
or the particular offenses go beyond what international law universalizes.
Another group of critics argued that foreign-cubed suits raised constitutional
problems, either by violating Article III’s exclusion of pure alien diversity
suits,29 or violating the Offenses Clause.30
B. ATS and Extraterritoriality in the Courts
The courts came even later to the extraterritoriality concerns.  The Sec-
ond Circuit’s seminal opinion in Filartiga only touched briefly on the extra-
territorial nature of the case, noting it “is not extraordinary” for courts to
hear such cases.31  In the decades that followed, federal courts heard a large
number of purely foreign ATS cases without the extraterritorial aspect being
litigated or discussed at all.  Indeed, observers assumed the ATS enjoyed a
crimes); Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New Approach, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1931, 1968 n.199 (2010) (suggesting that “the subject matter of the
statute itself would seem to defeat the presumption”).
26 See John B. Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien
Tort Statute and Other Approaches, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 9 (2009); Curtis A. Bradley,
The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 457, 460 (2001).
27 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains . . . .”).
28 See Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights
Litigation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 303–05 (2009).
29 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 591
(2002).
30 See Eugene Kontorovich, Discretion, Delegation, and Defining in the Constitution’s Law of
Nations Clause, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1675, 1743–49 (2012).
31 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980).  The Court invoked the
“transitory torts” doctrine.  The basic point is that U.S. law is not being applied extraterrito-
rially, but rather CIL created the cause of action already when the plaintiff was abroad, and
it is simply being brought in the United States. See id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-4\NDL406.txt unknown Seq: 7  9-MAY-14 10:51
2014] K I O B E L  surprise 1677
tacitly understood exemption to the extraterritoriality presumption, such
that courts did not even need to mention it.32
While some judges suggested that extraterritorial application may be
improper for international law reasons,33 the first judicial discussion of the
extraterritoriality presumption was in a single sentence, in a footnote, two
decades after Filartiga.34  The presumption against extraterritoriality was not
mentioned at all in any decision again for another decade, when it was sum-
marily dismissed by pointing to the “universal agreement” of federal courts to
hear such cases,35 though such agreement had not been supported by any
analysis of the applicability of the presumption.  Thus in the first thirty years
of ATS litigation, courts established a practice of hearing foreign-cubed cases
without any explanation and, when the question was finally raised, used the
unexamined sub silentio practice as its own justification.
At the same time as the Jarvis comment broached the issue,36 it was also
raised for the first time in litigation—not by counsel for the parties or by
scholars, but rather by the Justice Department.  The Department submitted
two amicus briefs, first in the Ninth Circuit’s en banc rehearing of Doe v.
Unocal in 2003,37 and then more extensively in a Supreme Court amicus brief
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain the following year.38  These briefs made a straight-
forward argument for the relevance of the presumption for ATS suits, noting
the lack of express language in the statute and the Framers’ shyness about
jurisdiction in foreign causes.  However, this was not the Department of Jus-
tice’s first foray into explaining the ATS: it had filed at least six prior amicus
briefs in ATS cases, starting with Filartiga, without having raised the extrater-
ritoriality issue.  Indeed, it had at times even supported jurisdiction in for-
eign-cubed cases.39  This may have weakened the force of the Department of
Justice’s new arguments.  A prominent group of foreign relations scholars
responded with an amicus brief countering the applicability of the presump-
32 See William S. Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation: The Road Not Taken, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1577, 1587 (2014) (noting that before the “revival” of the presumption in Aramaco in
1991, it seemed “highly unlikely” to scholars that the issue would be relevant to the ATS).
33 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 & n.7, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring).
34 See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 104 n.10 (2d Cir. 2000)
(“Whatever the intent of the original legislators . . . , the text of the Act seems to reach
claims for international human rights abuses occurring abroad.”).  The court supported
this conclusion only by citing its own prior decision in Filartiga, which itself offered no
discussion of the issue.  Still, the court argued that Filartiga has been “ratified” by Con-
gress’s passage of the Torture Victims Protection Act. Id. at 104.
35 E.g., In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
36 See Jarvis, supra note 14.
37 Brief for the United States of America, as Amicus Curiae at 2–4, Doe I v. Unocal,
395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628).
38 Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 48–49, Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), available at http://www.justice.gov/
osg/briefs/2003/3mer/2mer/2003-0339.mer.aa.pdf.
39 See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 681, 705 (2003).
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tion by noting the lack of textual geographic limitations, the transitory tort
doctrine, and the Bradford memo.40
The Department of Justice’s briefs did little to raise the profile of the
issue, either in the courts or in commentary.  Both the Ninth Circuit in Uno-
cal and the Supreme Court in Sosa avoided ruling on the extraterritoriality
issue.41  The extraterritoriality argument was only ruled on by a court of
appeals after thirty years of ATS litigation.42  In that period, there had been
no considered appellate decision on the extraterritorial application of the
statute—despite the vast scholarship on the ATS subject.  The issue was so
invisible that one court found, in a case against a former Salvadoran official
now a resident in the United States, that the suit was not barred by a Salvado-
ran amnesty law because “the Salvadoran Amnesty Law cannot be interpreted
to apply extraterritorially.  A statute must not be interpreted as having extra-
territorial effect without a clear indication that it was intended to apply
outside the country enacting it.”43  Yet the court did not pause to note that
there is no particular indication that the ATS applies to activities in El
Salvador.
Not surprisingly given this track record, the applicability of the presump-
tion was rejected when it finally received a hearing in a court of appeals in
2011 in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.44  Exxon had explicitly raised the statutory
presumption, albeit briefly, placing great reliance on the recently decided
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd case.45  However, a divided panel of
40 See Brief of Professors of Federal Jurisdiction and Legal History as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339), reprinted in 28 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 99, 115–17 (2004) (presenting brief of Professors Vikram Amar, William R.
Casto, Sarah H. Cleveland, Drew S. Days III, William S. Dodge, David M. Golove, Robert W.
Gordon, Stewart Jay, John V. Orth, Judith Resnik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter).  Another
amicus brief on behalf of seventy-five international and foreign relations scholars from
around the world made similar arguments. See Brief of Amici Curiae National and Foreign
Legal Scholars in Support of Respondents, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339), 2004 WL
419427, at *21–25.
41 Moreover, the Court in Sosa cited extraterritorial ATS cases favorably.  Justice
Breyer referred to the extraterritoriality issue, but only to note that universal jurisdiction
should only be exercised when clearly established in international law. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at
761–62 (Breyer, J., concurring).
42 See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (observing that
“[t]he issue of extraterritoriality . . . has yet to be decided by a circuit court of appeals”),
vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  The issue had been discussed solely in a dissent
the prior year. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 625 F.3d 561, 563–64 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kleinfeld,
J., dissenting).
43 Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 495 (6th Cir. 2009).
44 654 F.3d 11. Exxon Mobil itself happened not to be a foreign-cubed case, as the
defendant was an American corporation, though the relevant conduct occurred abroad.
45 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); see Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appel-
lants at 37–38, Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d 11 (No. 09-7125).  The issue was also discussed more
extensively in an amicus brief. See Brief of Washington Legal Foundation and Allied Edu-
cational Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees at 5–12, Exxon
Mobil 654 F.3d 11 (Nos. 09-7125, 09-7127, 09-7134, 09-7135).
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the District of Columbia Circuit held that the presumption, even as fortified
in Morrison, did not apply to the ATS because of the “foreign” nature of the
subject matter: alien plaintiffs and international law causes of action.46
Moreover, the court reasoned that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute, and
thus cannot apply extraterritorially.  Finally, the court noted that federal
courts had been entertaining foreign-cubed ATS suits with the acquiescence
of the Supreme Court in Sosa and Congress in the Torture Victims Protec-
tion Act (TVPA).47  The dissenting judge observed that “[s]omewhat surpris-
ingly, no court of appeals has analyzed whether the ATS applies to conduct
that took place in a foreign nation.”48  While acknowledging the prolifera-
tion of extraterritorial ATS cases, the dissent rejected using them to establish
the point as they “contain no judicial analysis of the extraterritoriality ques-
tion and thus provide no persuasive arguments for accepting the extraterrito-
rial application of the ATS.”49
Three days after Doe, the Seventh Circuit came out the same way.  It
devoted only a few sentences to the extraterritoriality issue, and instead of
considering the statute itself, it relied entirely on earlier courts’ entertaining
such suits, and Sosa’s failure to question the practice.50  Later that year, an
en banc Ninth Circuit  agreed, again relying primarily on the numerous
extraterritorial applications of the statute up to and including the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s Doe decision.51  Like the D.C. Circuit, it noted the statute’s “foreign”
subject matter, its jurisdictional nature,52 and the piracy anomaly.  A strong
dissent joined by three judges emphasized Morrison.53
Just a few months after the Doe and Rio Tinto decisions, the Supreme
Court raised the ATS issue itself during oral argument in Kiobel.  The issue
46 Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d at 20–22.
47 Id. at 26.
48 Id. at 74 n.3 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
49 Id.
50 Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011) (Pos-
ner, J.).  The court also argued that the ATS would be “superfluous” without extraterrito-
rial effect, as there were ample alternative remedies for the relevant conduct under U.S.
municipal law. Id.  Of course, this does not mean the statute would have been irrelevant if
applied territorially in 1790.
51 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 744–45 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[T]he
seminal and most widely respected applications of the statute relate to conduct that took
place outside the United States.”), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013).  The en banc court also
suggested that it had already decided the “same issue” in Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate of
Marcos), 978 F.2d 493, 499–501 (9th Cir. 1992). Sarei, 671 F.3d at 749.  Yet while Marcos
did discuss extraterritoriality and the lack of a U.S. nexus, it was in the context of the
plaintiff’s argument that there was no Article III subject matter jurisdiction for such suits.
The plaintiff essentially argued that this was a pure alienage suit; the Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, ruled that it “arose under” federal law because of the incorporation of customary
international law into federal common law. Marcos, 978 F.2d at 501–03.  The court never
considered whether the statute could be construed to apply extraterritorially even if it
would be constitutional to do so.
52 Sarei, 671 F.3d at 745–47.
53 See id. at 799 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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was absent from the Kiobel litigation until oral argument at the Supreme
Court,54 despite a whopping thirty-six submissions from the Court’s
friends.55  Thus, the Supreme Court greatly curtailed decades of litigation
based on an issue on which there was no circuit split and no significant aca-
demic critique, and that had not even been raised by the parties.  This is
quite extraordinary for Supreme Court practice.
C. Why Scholars Missed the Presumption
Obviously, one cannot know why scholars ignored the presumption.
Any explanation for academic trends would have to delve somewhat into col-
lective psychology; explaining the absence of a trend is even harder.  Still the
question calls for examination—even the courts have speculated about it.
One obvious reason is the academic enthusiasm for Filartiga and its
progeny.  A large sector of academia was evidently delighted by the opportu-
nities for numerous judicial decisions expounding, and perhaps expanding,
international law.56  Thus, scholarship in the first seventeen years after Filar-
tiga was celebratory in tone and not looking for implicit limitations on the
branch of litigation that is seen as having significant normative value.  Yet the
phenomenon cannot be attributed purely to ideological blinders.  Goldsmith
and Bradley’s 1997 article inspired a “backlash” against the ATS by a number
of serious international law and foreign relations scholars.57  These scholars
could have been expected to latch on to such issues, but did not, suggesting
it was part of a broader, value-neutral oversight.
The scholarly literature on both sides was characterized by complex and
arcane historical arguments, or far-flung tours through international conven-
tions and tribunals.  This is not surprising for a discussion of a statute that
slumbered for centuries.  All of this may be somewhat “foreign” or uncom-
fortable terrain for many Justices.  Yet the presumption is a standard judicial
instrument, found in the judicial toolbox alongside numerous other conven-
tions of statutory interpretation.  To put it differently, the presumption was
the least “fancy” answer to the ATS litigation suggested by conservative critics.
54 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117 n.10 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“We decline to address several other lurking questions, including whether the ATS applies
‘extraterritorially . . . .’”), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
55 Even the amicus brief by Prof. Jack Goldsmith on behalf of several corporations,
which was cited by the Justices during oral argument, did not deal with the presumption
against extraterritoriality.  Rather, it argued that the extraterritorial application of civil lia-
bility in such cases was not countenanced by international law. See Brief of Chevron Corp.
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Kiobel., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-
1491).
56 See Ku, supra note 18, at 357 (“Indeed, a survey of legal literature at the time sug-
gests that the decision was welcomed as identifying the long-missing entry point for inter-
national law and human-rights norms into the U.S. legal system.”); see, e.g., Anne-Marie
Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L.
461 (1989).
57 See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A
Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 377–80 (1997).
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It did not require making any rulings about the nature of customary interna-
tional law, post-Erie common law, or the Constitution.
Alternatively, one might speculate that it was the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Morrison that reinvigorated or strengthened the presumption, or at
least drew new attention to it.58 Morrison could also suggest that the Court
now took the presumption more seriously, and arguments based on the pre-
sumption would enjoy a more favorable hearing.  The Securities and
Exchange Act has also been on the books for quite a while, but only had its
extraterritorial effect determined in Morrison.59  Certainly the timing of
Kiobel, shortly after Morrison, might suggest a new salience for the presump-
tion that perhaps it did not previously obtain.  The unanimous vote on the
outcome in Kiobel lines up squarely with the unanimity of Morrison, with a few
liberal Justices concurring but suggesting more expansive tests.60
Yet this explanation can also only go so far.  For Morrison did not invent
the presumption against extraterritoriality, it only reemphasized and aggres-
sively applied61 principles that had been articulated two decades earlier in
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil (Aramco).62 Yet Aramco did not prompt any
examination of the relevance of the presumption to the newly booming
human rights litigation under the ATS.63
The Second Circuit in Kiobel seemed to acknowledge the oddity of the
extraterritoriality issue not being addressed after three decades of litigation.
It attributed the existence of such basic “unresolved [jurisprudential] issues
lurking” in ATS cases to the paucity of appellate decisions, which it in turn
attributed to settlements by defendants.64  The empirical basis of that theory
is shaky; of the 155 ATS cases filed against corporations in federal courts,
seventeen have settled.65  Even if true, this does not explain why scholars had
58 See Colangelo, supra note 7, at 1079–80 (observing that Morrison strengthens claims R
that the ATS should not apply extraterritorially).
59 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010) (“[D]isregard of the
presumption against extraterritoriality . . . has been repeated over many decades by various
courts of appeals in determining the application of the Exchange Act . . . .”).
60 See id. at 2888.
61 See id. at 2883–85 (applying EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244
(1990)).
62 499 U.S. at 246 (applying presumption of extraterritoriality to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
63 See Dodge, supra note 32, at 1587.
64 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d on other
grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).  Furthermore, numerous other cases are dismissed by dis-
trict courts on various procedural grounds such as immunity.
65 Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of Trans-
national Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 713 (2012).  To be sure, some of these settlements
were in high-profile cases. See, e.g., Bloomberg News, Unocal Settles Rights Suits in Myanmar,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/14/business/14unocal
.html.  And there are likely more settlements arrived at early on, or that have otherwise not
been publicized.  However, it does not appear that there was a lack of cases for developing
ATS principles.
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not taken a greater interest, and the volume of writing on the ATS always far
outpaced litigation.
The Second Circuit’s claim can, however, be developed somewhat.  In
the first “wave” of ATS litigation, defendants were typically private individuals
or sovereign actors with immunity.66  The former often simply failed to
defend and had default judgments entered against them.  In neither case
would arguments about the presumption arise.  More sophisticated defenses
were only mounted—and more cases filed—during the “second wave” of ATS
suits in the mid-90s, aimed at large corporations.67
While scholarly bias, the lower salience of the presumption before Morri-
son, and the relatively low volume of filings all help explain the disconnect
between what academia and what the Court thought dispositive, certainly
path dependence and settled assumptions come in to play as well.  The first
ATS cases neglected to consider the applicability of the presumption, and the
early celebratory academic work also said nothing about it.  These early cases
and writings created an aura of “settledness” around the question, though it
had never actually been examined.  Courts came to justify their non-applica-
tion of the presumption by referring to their prior, sub silentio actions.68  This
may well account for scholarly approaches also, with the scholars accepting
the assumptions of earlier cases.  This is not meant as a strong criticism.
Legal scholarship is awkwardly both positive and normative, with the line
between the two blurry.  Existing practice becomes its own justification
through the elision of is and ought—in law such elision is not without legiti-
macy.  It could only help that the results of the early decisions trajectory
accorded with a desire among prominent international law scholars to have a
mechanism for the “internalization” of international norms, but this factor
may not have been necessary.69
II. THE GLOBAL DECLINE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
While the Court’s direction in Kiobel may have been difficult to predict
on the background of lower courts’ ATS practice, it fits well with a broader
global phenomenon of retrenchment from UJ. Kiobel is part of a turning
against UJ by nations that had enthusiastically embraced it in the 1990s.
The past decade has witnessed several kinds of retrenchment from UJ.
Perhaps the first sign came in several opinions in the International Court of
Justice’s Belgium v. Congo case, which observed that despite the vast academic
66 See Julian G. Ku, The Third Wave: The Alien Tort Statute and the War on Terrorism, 19
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 105, 108 (2005).
67 Id. at 109.
68 See Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“Courts have been applying the statute extraterritorially (and not just to violations at sea)
since the beginning . . . .”).
69 Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J.
1397, 1414 (1999) (describing how ATS cases create a forum for development and elabora-
tion of incipient international law norms); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture:
Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 646–55, 665–66 (1998).
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proselytizing for UJ, “there is no established practice” for “pure universal
jurisdiction,” without any link to the forum.70  Since then, the number of UJ
cases has remained extremely low and is probably declining as a ratio of pos-
sible cases.  Thus the overall use of UJ appears to be flagging.  Second, some
of the nations that had been at the forefront of UJ revised their statutes to
substantially limit its exercise.  Third, numerous countries began to clearly
express opinio juris largely or totally denying the permissibility of UJ in inter-
national law.  Finally, the few cases where UJ is exercised fit an increasingly
defined pattern, involving defendants who had voluntarily taken up resi-
dence in the forum state.  Several thorough scholarly studies have called
attention to the decline of UJ.71 Kiobel follows and adds (perhaps not self
consciously) to this global trend.  Interestingly, it did so in spite of a scholars
amicus brief that suggested a broader global acceptance of UJ than actually
exists.72
Actual exercises of UJ have always been quite rare.  While the ATS was
always notable as the only civil use of UJ in the world,73 criminal cases are
also few and far between.  A comprehensive study by Maximo Langer has
found that only thirty-two such cases have gone to trial since World War II.74
Three-quarters of these involved defendants from three particular conflicts
70 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 76 (Feb.
14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal).
71 See Noora Araja¨rvi, Looking Back from Nowhere: Is There a Future for Universal Jurisdic-
tion over International Crimes?, 16 TILBURG L. REV. 5, 9 (2011); Ma´ximo Langer, The Diplo-
macy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of
International Crimes, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2011); Luc Reydams, The Rise and Fall of Univer-
sal Jurisdiction, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 337, 337–54
(William A. Schabas & Nadia Bernaz eds., 2011).
72 See Supplemental Brief of Yale Law Sch. Ctr. for Global Legal Challenges as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013) (No. 10-1491).  The brief focused mostly on laws that would on their face permit
UJ, without noting the overwhelming disuse of such laws, and their frequent amendment
in the face of actual use. See id. at 28–35.  The supplemental brief only identified two civil
cases around the world implementing the principles, and only one of these cases was actu-
ally a foreign-cubed case. See id. at 36–38.
73 See Menno T. Kamminga, Universal Civil Jurisdiction: Is It Legal? Is It Desirable?, 99 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 123, 124 (2005).  Ironically, shortly after reargument in Kiobel, a
Dutch court awarded that country’s first civil UJ judgment to a Palestinian doctor for tor-
ture in Libya. See Dutch Court Compensates Palestinian for Libya Jail, BBC NEWS (March 28,
2012, 8:09 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17537597.  Thus after
Kiobel, the number of nations engaged in the civil UJ enterprise remains one.  Even more
ironically, Holland filed an amicus brief in Kiobel, a case against a Dutch company, criticiz-
ing the propriety of UJ in such cases.  This fits the broader pattern of nations approving of
UJ when someone else’s ox is gored. See Brief of the Governments of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici
Curiae in Support of the Respondents at 31, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL
405480, at *31 (“[T]he lower courts have both asserted jurisdiction with regard to a wider
category of such [international law] violations [than is proper], and in relation to facts in
which a ‘sufficiently close connection’ to the U.S. is entirely absent.”).
74 See Langer, supra note 71, at 7–9.
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that had been made the subject of extraordinary international tribunals
(Rwandans, Yugoslavs, and Nazis).  Moreover, as a proportion of cases that
qualify for UJ prosecution, the enforcement rate approaches zero.75
Of course, a major practical limitation for criminal UJ is obtaining cus-
tody over the world’s war criminals and genocidaires, at least for nations that
do not allow for trials in abstentia.  Even given this limitation, the exercise of
UJ is extremely rare.  For example, the British Home Office is aware of nearly
700 to 800 suspected war criminals residing in Britain—over 100 applied for
asylum in 2012 alone.76  Yet, rather than prosecuting these individuals, the
government at most seeks to return those against whom there is already cred-
ible evidence to their home countries.  Indeed, while Britain provided a mas-
sive publicity boost for UJ in the Pinochet case (which itself did not directly
raise universality issues),77 it has only universally prosecuted two defend-
ants—an Afghan paramilitary officer and a Nepalese colonel, both for tor-
ture.78  Both defendants resided in Britain and had committed their crimes
under a defunct regime that did not object to their prosecution.
Several states that had been relatively active in pursuing high-profile UJ
cases have severely curtailed the future scope of such action through legisla-
tive reforms and judicial decisions.  In a series of statutory amendments cul-
minating in 2003, Belgium effectively gutted the universal reach of its once
ambitious law that had seen cases brought against Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon, as well as President George W. Bush, General Tommy Franks, and
others over alleged war crimes in Iraq.79  Spain, perhaps Europe’s leading
forum for UJ investigations, substantially revised its laws in 2009 to abolish
universality by requiring some nexus with Spain,80 and in 2014 introduced
legislation to restrict it further still.81  France changed its UJ law to greatly
restrict the potential causes of action, require the defendant to reside in
75 See Eugene Kontorovich & Steven Art, An Empirical Examination of Universal Jurisdic-
tion for Piracy, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 436, 436 (2010).
76 See Tom Bateman, ‘Nearly 100 War Crimes Suspects’ in UK Last Year, BBC NEWS (July
30, 2013, 5:17 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23495314.
77 R. v. Bartle, ex parte Pinochet (No. 3), [1999] UKHL 17, [2000] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 147
(appeal taken from Eng.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld1998
99/ldjudgmt/jd990324/pino1.htm.  The Lords in the Pinochet case entertained an exten-
sive discussion of the universality principle as it related to the grounds for extradition.
However, the actual charges against Pinochet all involved extraterritorial crimes against
Spanish nationals, making it an exercise of the passive personality principle.
78 See UK Exercises Universal Jurisdiction to Prosecute Nepalese Colonel for Torture, INT’L JUST.
RES. CTR. (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.ijrcenter.org/2013/01/09/uk-exercises-universal-jur
isdiction-to-prosecute-nepalese-colonel-for-torture.
79 See Steven R. Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT’L L.
888, 888–89 (2003).
80 See Araja¨rvi, supra note 71, at 18.
81 Matt Moffett, Spain’s Lower House Approves Law to Limit Judges’ Reach, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 11, 2014, 4:20 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304558
804579376842263831908 (reporting on passage of bill by lower house that would require
that extraterritorial torture plaintiffs be Spanish citizens at the time of the event, and that
in other cases, foreign defendants must reside, rather than merely be present in Spain).
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France, and eliminate privately initiated proceedings.82  Most recently, Brit-
ain in 2011 tightened its laws by limiting the ability of private parties to initi-
ate criminal complaints, which had been the primary vehicle for UJ cases.83
In what appears to be a global trend, other prominent Western nations have
also begun to discuss limiting their broad UJ statutes.84
Finally, some nations have begun to suggest that UJ may not even be a
genuine established norm of international law.  The U.N. General Assembly
(GA) has over the past several years conducted an extensive inquiry into
“[t]he scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction.”85  In
the process, several states, including China, rejected the existence of univer-
sality beyond piracy,86 while others suggested it was still an “incipient” but
not full-fledged norm.87  On the whole, the international consensus about UJ
seems to fall short of the well-settled norms described by many publicists.
According to the United Nations:
With respect to the scope of universal jurisdiction, delegations
expressed divergent opinions.  Some delegations emphasized that there was
no clarity or consensus on the scope of crimes covered by the principle beyond
piracy . . . . The view was also expressed that the material scope of universal
jurisdiction was in fact under constant development and it was questioned,
whether it was advisable to reach a consensus on a list of crimes.  Some dele-
gations cautioned against any unwarranted expansion of the crimes covered
under universal jurisdiction.88
In a meeting the subsequent year, GA delegates expressed further wide-
ranging concerns about UJ.  African representatives criticized the doctrine
broadly, while the Spanish delegate observed “there was no common under-
standing of the circumstances and conditions of its application.”89
The practice of other nations also reveals structural problems with the
ATS’s “implied” universality.  Universal jurisdiction can take many different
forms, from “pure” universality to more limited versions that require some
82 See Langer, supra note 71, at 25.
83 See Recent Legislation: International Law—Universal Jurisdiction—United Kingdom Adds
Barrier to Private Prosecution of Universal Jurisdiction Crimes.—Police Reform and Social Responsi-
bility Act, 2011, c. 13 (U.K.)., 125 HARV. L. REV. 1554, 1554 (2012) (noting the law is “the
latest in a trend of states’ . . . tightening universal jurisdiction legislation”).
84 See Araja¨rvi, supra note 71, at 18.
85 U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., 12th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.12 (Oct. 12, 2011).
86 See Statement by Ms. Zhou Lulu at the Sixth Committee of the 65th Session of the UN General
Assembly on Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, PERMANENT MISSION
CHINA TO UN (Oct. 18, 2010), www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t762543.htm.
87 Sixty-Fifth Session: The Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction
(Agenda Item 86), GEN. ASSEMBLY UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/
ScopeAppUniJuri.shtml (last visited Mar. 11, 2014) [hereinafter Agenda Item 86]; see also
U.N. GAOR, supra note 85, at 2–4 (documenting the response of Iran, Qatar, and Egypt).
88 Agenda Item 86, supra note 87 (emphasis added).
89 Press Release, Gen. Assembly, Principle of ‘Universal Jurisdiction’ Again Divides
Assembly’s Legal Committee, Delegates; Further Guidance Sought from International Law
Commission, U.N. Press Release GA/L/3415 (Oct. 12, 2011), available at http://www.un
.org/News/Press/docs/2011/gal3415.doc.htm.
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substantial nexus between the crime and the forum.90  At a minimum, there
may already be an international consensus that UJ requires that the defen-
dant have become a resident in the forum.91  Such cases dominate the few
non-piracy UJ trials since World War II.
When the defendant resides in the forum, UJ becomes more of a substi-
tute for extradition or deportation than a tool against impunity.  Aside from
pure reciprocity, one reason nations extradite suspected foreign criminals is
to avoid becoming a haven for foreign law-breakers.92  The gravity of UJ
crimes may make nations particularly desirous of keeping their perpetrators
out.  However, because of the nature of the crimes, the non-refoulement doc-
trine may frustrate extradition, either because the defendant would be
unlikely to get a remotely fair trial, or because conditions in the home coun-
try are otherwise bad enough.  These considerations are not present in most
ATS cases, which have almost always involved defendants abroad (though
with some contacts to the United States).  While Filartiga fit the global para-
digm perfectly—the defendant had taken up U.S. residency—however, most
subsequent ATS cases departed widely from the Filartiga model by allowing
“pure” UJ.
The growing trend of hostility to and retrenchment from UJ has rele-
vance to the presumption against extraterritoriality in Kiobel. (It is also rele-
vant to the substantive question of whether UJ would exist for particular ATS
causes of action, and whether applications of the statute violate the Charming
Betsy canon.)  The international trend creates a context where one cannot
easily read a statute silent on the subject as broadly asserting UJ.93  To put it
differently, the Kiobel plaintiffs had argued that UJ can be assumed for ATS
causes of action because they are sound in international law, and interna-
tional law authorizes UJ.  But recent experience shows that: i) the extent of
this authorization is hotly debated among states, and moreover, ii) states are
not interested in exercising UJ up to the international law maximum.  Thus
recent legislation either eliminated or greatly restricted UJ in states that had
previously been at the forefront of transnational justice.
The presumption against extraterritoriality is a default rule about con-
gressional intent.  As applied to the ATS, however, it is in no way a recon-
struction of the intent of the 1791 drafters, because of the numerous
intervening developments that make their “intent” in this matter entirely
notional—the abolition of federal common law in Erie, the rise of interna-
tional human rights law, and the expansion of UJ to conduct in foreign coun-
tries.  Thus, perhaps the actions of other Western legislatures can serve as a
closer proxy for congressional intent.
90 See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 42
(Feb. 14) (separate opinion of President Guillaume) (finding no support in international
law for universal jurisdiction where the offender is not present in the jurisdiction).
91 See Araja¨rvi, supra note 71, at 15–20; Langer, supra note 71, at 25.
92 See IVAN ANTHONY SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 12, 19–20 (1971).
93 Of course, current developments have no bearing on the original intent of the
ATS’s enactors.  But it becomes relevant given the lack of direct evidence of such intent.
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III. A PRESUMPTION AGAINST UNIVERSALITY, NOT MERE
EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Kiobel ’s extraterritoriality ruling has been criticized as not fitting the typ-
ical parameters of the presumption, which many see as inapplicable to juris-
dictional statutes.94  In this view, the case was not about anti-
extraterritoriality, but about something else.  If so, it is no surprise the pre-
sumption had been absent from prior academic debates: Kiobel in this view
just got things badly wrong, and the professors had it right.  As this Part will
show, there is a another way of understanding Kiobel that does not reject the
Court’s approach, but makes sense of some of its tensions with typical appli-
cations of extraterritoriality presumption.
This Part argues that the ATS foreign-cubed cases involve a rule of con-
struction that could more productively be described as a cousin of the extra-
territoriality presumption—a presumption against universality.  This
presumption, based on Congress’s actual legislative practice, assumes that
Congress does not intend to authorize UJ unless it explicitly says so, even for
causes of action where international law would allow it.95  Section A discusses
and distinguishes between the extraterritoriality presumption and the rarer
universality presumption.  Section B comprehensively surveys the statutes
under which UJ has been found to exist.  It finds that: i) Congress has never
authorized UJ without a clear statement; ii) authorizations come in a variety
of shapes and sizes, but are generally narrower than “pure” UJ of the kind
exercised in ATS cases; and iii) the existence of UJ under international law is
neither necessary nor sufficient for its availability under a statute, even one
that purports to reflect international law.  Thus when a statute is silent on the
matter, the availability of UJ in international law does not demonstrate its
availability under the statute.
A. Did Kiobel Really Apply the Extraterritoriality Presumption?
Professor Anthony Colangelo has argued that the presumption has thus
far only applied to substantive, not jurisdictional statutes.96  But the ATS as
explicated in Sosa is not a garden-variety jurisdictional statute; rather, it is at
once both jurisdictional and substantive in that it authorizes the creation of
94 See William S. Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation and the Prescriptive Jurisdiction Fallacy, 51
HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 35, 44–46 (2010).
95 Thus the “universality canon” is the opposite of the proposed “extrajurisdictionality
canon” that would interpret such statutes as applying to the maximum level of universality
permitted by international law. See Colangelo, supra note 7, at 1023 (“[W]hen Congress R
enacts a statute silent on geographic scope designed to implement international substan-
tive law, courts should construe that statute in line with international jurisdictional law,
including attendant principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction.”). See generally John H. Knox,
A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351 (2010) (proposing pre-
sumption against extrajurisdictionality to define geographic scope of U.S. law).
96 See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations in Kiobel and
Beyond, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1329, 1331 & n.8 (2013).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-4\NDL406.txt unknown Seq: 18  9-MAY-14 10:51
1688 notre dame law review [vol. 89:4
federal common law.97  Moreover, the applicability of the presumption to
jurisdictional norms that “incorporate by reference” substantive law, like the
ATS, remains the subject of a circuit split.98  Relatedly, scholars have argued
that the point of the presumption against extraterritoriality is to avoid sub-
jecting extraterritorial actors to conflicting regulatory regimes.99  Yet if the
rule of decision comes from CIL, there can be no conflict.  (Of course, as a
practical matter, the application of CIL from one nation to another could
vary as much as the general common law of the pre-Erie era.)  But conflict
and foreign relations implications are only one set of reasons for the pre-
sumption;100 another is a more empirical and psychological assumption that
extraterritoriality is simply not what Congress intends, without a clear state-
ment, because it typically is not interested in regulating such conduct, and
because many general words could sweep in such cases inadvertently.101
Thus the Court has held the presumption applies to Antarctica, where there
is no possible conflict with foreign law.102
More evidence of the misfit between Kiobel and the presumption comes
in its treatment of piracy, which the Court assumes falls within the ATS
despite, by definition, occurring on the high seas.  The presumption typically
excludes high seas cases (though there is no reason in principle that one
cannot have a more reticulated or segmented presumption).  The Court
97 See generally Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy
Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111 (2004) (discuss-
ing piracy and the historical test of Sosa).  Such quasi-substantive, quasi-jurisdictional stat-
utes are uncommon. See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Textile Work-
ers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456–57 (1957) (describing the substantive
dimension of the Taft-Hartley Act).
98 Compare United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 212 & n.6 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding
that presumption against extraterritoriality applied to statute defining “special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” because while that statute “is the immedi-
ate focus of our inquiry, the ultimate question here is whether a criminal statute— i.e., 18
U.S.C. § 2243(a)—applies extraterritorially”) (internal quotation marks omitted), with
United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1176 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding presumption
did not apply because there was no risk of conflict with foreign countries).
99 See generally Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between Prescriptive
and Adjudicative Jurisdiction, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 65, 66 (2013) (“The presumption has tradi-
tionally applied only to exercises of U.S. jurisdiction to prescribe conduct-regulating rules
over persons or things abroad.”); William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 18 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 85, 115–17 (1998) (identifying avoidance of con-
flicts with foreign law as a possible reason for the presumption against extraterritoriality).
100 To be sure, these were the policies stressed by the Court in Kiobel.  See Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664–65 (2013).
101 See id. at 1665 (noting that the words “any civil action” rarely take on a literal mean-
ing) (internal quotation marks omitted).
102 See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993) (stating that the presump-
tion is based not only in conflict-avoidance, but rather “is rooted in a number of considera-
tions, not the least of which is the commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates
with domestic concerns in mind”).
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seemed to acknowledge this awkward fit by saying piracy is sui generis.103
Finally, this application of the presumption does not account for the famous
nineteenth-century Attorney General opinion that suggested an extraterrito-
rial application, though this does not seem like a fatal flaw.
All these objections about Kiobel’s use of the presumption fall away if the
case is understood as involving a narrower version of the presumption.  The
presumption Kiobel used is a presumption against universality, a subspecies of
extraterritoriality.  To be sure, the Court called it by the same name, which is
not surprising, as the extraterritoriality presumption is much more com-
monly used.  Yet the anti-universality presumption serves related but distinct
policy goals.  If Kiobel is understood as involving an anti-universality presump-
tion, it leaves room for the kind of ATS suits envisioned by the Kiobel concur-
rences that involve those actions of Americans abroad.104
Even the most controversial and aggressive uses of extraterritoriality typi-
cally involve the regulation of American-related conduct abroad.105  The pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality screens out cases involving foreign
conduct with a weak or incidental (but direct) relation to the United States,
while admitting foreign conduct targeted at the United States.106  There is
always some conduct involving the United States in extraterritoriality cases—
that is why the relevant statutes could be plausibly read as covering it.  For
example, Morrison involved a suit under the Securities and Exchange Act
about the sale of securities abroad of a U.S. company engaged in fraudulent
activity in the United States.  The Court noted that the defendants commit-
ted their deceptions in the United States:
This is less an answer to the presumption against extraterritorial application
than it is an assertion—a quite valid assertion—that that presumption here
(as often) is not self-evidently dispositive, but its application requires further
analysis.  For it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that
lacks all contact with the territory of the United States.  But the presumption
against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it
retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the
case.107
Yet the line of ATS cases from Filartiga to Kiobel is unusual in that these
cases involve conduct with no particular effects in the United States whatso-
ever.  These are suits by foreigners against foreigners for conduct that took
place entirely abroad and has no particular effect on the United States.
Indeed, in the lower courts, the issue came to be known as “foreign-cubed”
103 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667 (“[P]irates may well be a category unto themselves.”).
104 See Doug Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The Supreme Court
Leaves the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1773, 1780–83 (2014).
105 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (applying the
Sherman Antitrust Act to foreign conduct with expected domestic effects).
106 See, e.g., United States v. Hijazi, 845 F. Supp. 2d 874, 902 (C.D. Ill. 2011) (holding
presumption against extraterritoriality lifted when “the conduct proscribed causes or is
likely [the] cause [of] significant injury to the U.S.”).
107 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010).
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suits (foreign plaintiffs, defendants, and locus),108 not merely extraterritorial
ones.  Even assuming the relevant exercise of UJ is consistent with interna-
tional law, Congress does not typically extend its laws that far.  The policies
behind the presumption are related to the extraterritorial one.  First, there is
an empirical fact, discussed below, that Congress does not generally go to the
international law maximum of UJ even in statutes that explicitly provide for
some universality.  Thus finding pure UJ by implication would be unwar-
ranted.  Second, a parochial prioritization of more direct U.S. interests would
caution against sweeping into federal courts cases with no U.S. nexus.109
The extreme rarity of legislation with a plausibly universal scope also pro-
vides a reason for the anti-universality presumption: Congress allows univer-
sality so infrequently that it makes more sense to require it to clearly say so on
those occasions than for courts to repeatedly consider the possible universal
application of numerous statutes through lawsuits.
B. Congress Does Not Extend Universality to the International Law Maximum
1. John Marshall and the Early Republic
The anti-universality presumption is not a modern creation.  Indeed, it is
at least as old as the presumption against extraterritoriality, if not older.110
From the founding of the nation until after World War II, piracy was the only
UJ offense in international law.  In United States v. Palmer, Chief Justice Mar-
shall read a statute passed by the First Congress criminalizing “piracy” by “any
person” as requiring a U.S. nexus, even though it was clear that Congress
could apply the statute universally.111  Marshall saw this as involving principles
of construction: “no general words of a statute ought to be construed to
embrace [crimes] when committed by foreigners against a foreign govern-
108 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 794 (9th Cir. 2011) (Bea, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013).  Ironically, the foreign-cubed
term comes from an extraterritoriality case. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547
F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing the first “ ‘foreign-cubed’” securities class action
to reach the Second Circuit ), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 2884.
109 Thus the executive in 1823 chose to narrowly interpret authority under a piracy
statute that specifically invoked the law of nations because
[a]dmitting the act might be extended this far, it does not appear to have been the
general object of the law; and it is thought by the President most advisable, at pre-
sent, not to give it a like indiscriminate practical construction as to all vessels.
The great object [of the statute], . . . was to protect the merchant vessels of the
United States and their crews from piratical aggressions.
Smith Thompson, Copy of General Instructions, for Officers Commanding Cruising Vessels, in 2
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS 211, 211 (Asbury Dickins & John W. Forney eds.,
Washington, Gales & Seaton 1860) (emphasis added).
110 See Dodge, supra note 99, at 85 n.2 (citing anti-universality cases as the first exam-
ples of “extraterritoriality” presumption).
111 See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 630–33 (1818).
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ment.”112  Congress is generally understood as only legislating to protect con-
crete American interests, “not offences against the human race.”113
To be sure, Congress quickly overrode the Palmer construction, at least
partially.114  Chief Justice Marshall certainly knew that piracy could be pun-
ished universally.  His insistence on reading the statute narrowly suggests that
universality is both rare and extraordinary enough to require a clear state-
ment.  Congress’s reaction also underscores the ability of Congress to correct
judicial errors in the application of an anti-universality presumption.
2. Contemporary Statutes Are Always Explicit About Universal Jurisdiction
The validity of an anti-universality presumption is strengthened by the
fact that even for the very few activities where international law clearly autho-
rizes UJ, Congress has either conspicuously excluded it or specifically and
clearly authorized UJ.  When Congress legislates about crimes that are uni-
versally cognizable in international law, it does not assume that the very sub-
ject matter rebuts the anti-universality presumption; rather, it requires an
express statement.  That legislative statement also specifies the precise con-
tours and scope of UJ under the statute, whether it applies criminally and
civilly, and includes other important narrowing details.  Moreover, Congress
has applied UJ even where not authorized by international law and has not
applied it where it is authorized.  Thus the law of nations appears to be no
guide in interpreting the universal application of federal legislation.
Genocide is the paradigmatic modern UJ crime in CIL.  Yet the 1988
Proxmire Act criminalizes it only when “the offense is committed within the
United States” or where “the alleged offender is a national of the United
States.”115  Only after further consideration, and an explicit discussion of UJ,
did Congress pass the Genocide Accountability Act,116 which extended UJ to
foreign conduct by non-Americans, provided that they would subsequently
be present in the United States.117  Similarly, though torture is by treaty a UJ
crime, the criminal statute implementing the Torture Convention expressly
applies “outside the United States” and “irrespective of the nationality of the
victim or the alleged offender.”118  On the other hand, the statute criminaliz-
112 Id. at 632–33.
113 Id. at 631. See generally Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause and the
Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 185 (2009) (discussing Chief Justice
Marshall’s conclusion in Palmer that Congress could not have put “offences against the
human race” under the Act) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114 See Kontorovich, supra note 113, at 189.
115 Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-606, 102 Stat.
3045, 3046 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d)(1)–(2) (2006)).
116 Genocide Accountability Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-151, 121 Stat 1821 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
117 See 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e)(2)(B)–(D).
118 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a), (b)(2) (2006); see also Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)) (pro-
viding universal civil remedy for torture).  Here, as with the genocide statute, the legislative
history explicitly embraced universality. See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991).
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ing another universal offense, war crimes, explicitly excludes UJ,119 but
allows for extraterritoriality.120  Other statutes implementing treaty-based UJ
also clearly provide for such jurisdiction.121
These examples show that for the UJ crimes that Congress has legislated
about in modern times, Congress has either: i) explicitly excluded UJ; ii)
explicitly included it subject to particular limitations;122 iii) excluded it and
then specifically added it.  Thus statutes dealing with international offenses
cannot be assumed to have universal scope unless Congress has expressly pro-
vided for it.  There is simply no precedent—outside the ATS—for implicit
universality, and a great deal against it.  Moreover, in the few cases where
Congress does create UJ, it does so in a limited form.  Implying blanket UJ
into a silent statute goes against the evidence of congressional practice, even
when such UJ would be authorized by international law.  Finally, the parallel
practice of other nations, discussed in Part II above, shows that the maximal
exercise of UJ cannot be assumed from statutes that do not provide for it.
3. Universal Application Cannot Be Assumed from International Law
Congress’s assertions of UJ have little to do with whether international
law permits it.  We have seen Congress has failed to extend UJ in cases where
international law would authorize it (war crimes, genocide, and piracy for a
while).  But it has also done the opposite—authorizing UJ where interna-
tional law does not.  For example, the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
extends U.S. narcotics laws to foreign vessels on the high seas, without any
U.S. nexus required.123  Here Congress plainly stated its intention for univer-
119 See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(b) (2006) (limiting application of war crimes statute to situa-
tions where offender or victim is U.S. national or service member).
120 See id. § 2441(a) (applying statute “inside or outside the United States”).
121 See id. § 2280(b)(1)(C) (authorizing jurisdiction over violence against maritime
navigation on the high seas when “the offender is later found in the United States after
such activity is committed”); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 201; see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 32(b)(3) (criminalizing the placing of an object on an aircraft which may damage it); id.
§ 1203(b)(1)(B) (extending jurisdiction solely on the basis of subsequent U.S. presence of
suspect, pursuant to the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages); 49
U.S.C. § 46502(b) (implementing the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft); United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1131–32 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that
Congress specifically intended to create universal jurisdiction over hijacking); Eugene
Kontorovich, International Decisions: United States v. Shi, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 734, 738–39
(2009) (discussing first and only universal jurisdiction application of the SUA statute).
122 In another example, the Trafficking in Persons Accountability Act of 2008, which
passed the Senate but not the House, allows for “extra-territorial jurisdiction” over conduct
committed by persons present in the United States, but also provides a carve-out for cases
involving proceedings in other countries. See S. 1703, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008).
123 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1) (2006).  The statute makes clear it applies to foreign ships
outside the United States, and also specifically reaffirms its “extension beyond territorial
jurisdiction,” as well as the irrelevance of international law that might limit such universal-
ity. Id. §§ 70503(b), 70505.
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sal application.124  In recent years, a few new statutes have extended UJ to
material support for terrorism125 and recruiting child soldiers.  Such statutes
also make their universality quite explicit (and limited).126  Moreover, some
of these criminal statutes have civil analogs, with the same jurisdictional
reach.127  Yet neither drug trafficking, material support for terrorism, nor
child soldiers are universally cognizable by the law of nations.  These statutes,
like the ones discussed in subsection B.2, above, demonstrate several things.
First, UJ in statutes is expressed quite explicitly; Congress understands how
extraordinary it is and thus spells it out.  Second, UJ in statutes is not one-
size-fits-all or “pure,” but rather some narrower, tailored form that at least
requires the territorial presence of the defendant, consistent with the over-
whelming weight of international practice.  Third, civil UJ can be narrower
than criminal, but there are no examples of the opposite being the case.
Finally, and most intriguingly, much statutory UJ applies to crimes that
do not clearly have this status in international law.  In these cases, the United
States exercises UJ in violation of, or at least without license from, CIL.  This
weakens the argument that because the ATS mentions CIL, it should be read
as authorizing UJ to the maximum extent permitted by CIL.  For not only do
statutes that explicitly address the matter refuse to go to the international law
limit (e.g., genocide), they sometimes exercise UJ despite CIL.  Either way,
CIL does not appear to be a useful guide to the UJ intended by statutes.
CONCLUSION
The rejection of UJ suits under the ATS in Kiobel is a lesson in the
agenda-shaping power of the Court and the Justice Department, and a hum-
bling one for the numerous academics, including the present author, who
had developed more elaborate accounts of the statute that were ultimately
mooted.  But aside from being a fascinating example of legal doctrine devel-
oping divorced from academia, it does show strong parallels with global
trends in UJ.  Many leading UJ countries have in recent years backed away
124 See generally Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond the Article I Horizon: Congress’s Enumerated
Powers and Universal Jurisdiction over Drug Crimes, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1191 (2009) (discussing
expanding jurisdiction over high seas and ultimately concluding that there is no clear Arti-
cle I source in the absence of a U.S. nexus).
125 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (2006); see also Eugene Kontorovich, The Offenses
Clause & Universal Jurisdiction over Terrorists, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www
.volokh.com/2013/01/02/the-offenses-clause-universal-jurisdiction-over-terrorists (discuss-
ing a prosecution under the statute).
126 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)(1)(C), (d)(2) (providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction
and universal jurisdiction so long as “after the conduct . . . occurs an offender is brought
into or found in the United States, even if the conduct required for the offense occurs
outside the United States”); see also id. § 2339B(b) (providing for civil penalty against
financial institutions but not natural persons); id. § 2442(c)(3)–(4) (Supp. II 2008)
(extending jurisdiction for criminalization of enlistment of child soldiers not within the
United States when the “offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the nation-
ality of the alleged offender”).
127 See 46 U.S.C. § 70506 (providing for civil penalty for maritime narcotics trafficking).
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from the aggressive assertion of international law, and Kiobel represents
another large step in that direction.  Finally, Kiobel may best be understood as
reading the statute to avoid universality, rather than mere extraterritoriality.
